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Hills v. Commissioner:
The Meaning of "Compensated for by Insurance" in
Internal Revenue Code Section 165 (a)
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1976 the taxpayers' lakefront home in rural Georgia was burglarized
for the fourth time in eight years.' They did not claim insurance reimburse-
ment for this theft, as they had for the previous three, because they feared
that their policy would not be renewed. Nonrenewal meant losing not only
their theft coverage, but also their fire insurance coverage.2 Instead, the tax-
payers claimed a casualty loss deduction pursuant to section 165 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).3 Section 165(a) allows a deduction for any loss
sustained if "not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.",
4
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) issued a stat-
utory notice of deficiency, determining that the taxpayers were "not entitled
to deduct a theft loss when ... covered by an insurance policy and no claim
for recovery was filed under the policy." 5 Thereafter, the taxpayers petition-
ed the Tax Court, contending that the deduction should have been allowed
since they were in the same position as a taxpayer who had no insurance.6
The taxpayers did not allege nor attempt to prove that the insurer denied
liability. 7 In fact, they conceded "that reimbursement for this loss could
probably have been received from the insurance company had a claim been
filed." 8 The Tax Court allowed the deduction, holding that for the purposes
of section 165(a), "compensated" does not mean "covered." 9 Rather, the
court said that under "the normal, everyday meaning of the word .... [t]o
compensate denotes 'to pay' or 'to make up for."'" " Since the taxpayers did
not benefit from any actual recoupment for the loss," the Tax Court reasoned
1. Hills v. Commissioner, 76T.C. 484,485 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-7668 (I Ith Cir. Aug. 17, 1981).
2. Brief for Petitioners at 2.
3. 76 T.C. 484, 485 (1981).
4. I.R.C. § 165 (1978) provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable
year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
(c) LIMITATION ON LOSSES OF INDIVIDUALS.-In the case of an individual, the deduction under
subsection (a) shall be limited to-
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade or
business; and
(3) losses of property not connected with a trade or business, if such losses arise from fire, storm,
shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.
5. Brief for Respondent at 5.
6. 76 T.C. 484, 486 (1981).
7. Id. at 492 (Sterrett, J., dissenting).
8. Brief for Petitioners at 2.
9. 76 T.C. 484, 486 (1981).
10. Id. at 486-87.
1I. Id. at 487.
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that the loss deduction should be granted, as if the taxpayers had been un-
insured. 12
The Tax Court apparently felt sympathy for the Hillses, who were vir-
tually in a no-win situation. They could either file the small-theft claim and
risk losing the catastrophic coverage on the house, or not file the claim and
pay for the loss themselves while attempting to recoup some of it through an
income tax deduction. Furthermore, the Hillses' fear is not without support.
One New York investment counselor advises his clients not to insure against
small losses because even though "[u]nderwriters expect to pay off on the
target event, [they] hate a series of small claims that roughly offset the pre-
mium payments." " Consequently, repeated claims will result in policy can-
cellations or higher premiums.t4
A rational businessperson surely would forego a $1,000 claim to keep
$100,000 of catastrophic coverage. But the business taxpayer who takes
an income tax deduction without filing an insurance claim can be criticized for
double deducting since insurance premiums are deductible as a trade or busi-
ness expense. 15 However, individual taxpayers, like the Hillses, could not be
so criticized, because their insurance premiums are not deductible since they
are a personal, living, or family expense. 16 Nevertheless, serious income tax
problems arise from allowing individual taxpayers to forego claiming insurance
coverage and to take income tax deductions instead.
This Case Comment demonstrates that the better interpretation of the
word "compensated" as used in section 165(a) of the I.R.C. is "covered."
This construction is supported by legislative history 17 and by an analysis of
Tax Court 18 and other judicial precedents,' 9 as well as by analogies to well-
settled constructions of other sections of the I.R.C. 20 As this Case Comment
illustrates, it appears that the Tax Court in Hills v. Commissioner2' declined
to follow the doctrine of stare decisis. 2' Finally, this Case Comment discusses
the Tax Court's fairness argument 2 and other income tax policies.
12. Id. at 488.
13. Train, Insurance: What You Need-And Don't Need, FORBES, Sept. 28, 1981, at 192.
14. Id. at 193.
15. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1978).
16. I.R.C. § 262 (1978); Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b) (1958).
17. See J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS (1938-
1861), at 1018 (1938).
18. Miller v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 528 (1980), vacated, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 665 (1981); Jewell v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 791 (1978); Morgan v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 524 (1978); Axelrod v. Commis-
sioner, 56 T.C. 248 (1971); Gale v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 269 (1963); Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. Commissioner,
25 T.C. 1053 (1956); Henry Kraft Mercantile Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 833 (1955); Brown v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C. 156 (1954); Whitney v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 897 (1949); Licht v. Commissioner, 37
B.T.A. 1096 (1938); Allied Furriers Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 457 (1931).
19. Alison v. United States, 344 U.S. 167 (1952); Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287 (1945); Kentucky
Utils. Co. v. Glenn, 394 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1968), affg 250 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Ky. 1965); Commissioner v.
Harwick, 184 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1950); Cahn v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1937), revg 33 B.T.A. 783
(1935); Commissioner v. Highway Trailer Co., 72 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1934); Waxler Towing Co. v. United States,
510 F. Supp. 297,(W.D. Tenn. 1980); Bartlett v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 216 (D. Md. 1975).
20. I.R.C. §§ 61 (1967), 162, 166, 213 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 152-84.
21. 76 T.C. 484 (1981).
22. See H. BLACK, LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 203-18 (1912).
23. 76 T.C. 484, 488 (1981).
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF "COMPENSATED FOR BY INSURANCE"
The legislative history of section 165(a) is scant2 4 and offers no definitive
solution to the controversy at issue in Hills. The phrase "not compensated for
by insurance" first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1894.2 That Act was
declared unconstitutional,26 but identical language later reappeared and has
remained the same. The original version by the House Ways and Means
Committee referred to "losses actually sustained during the year ... and not
covered by insurance or otherwise, and compensated for."' 7 The final version
reported by the Senate Finance Committee read "losses actually sustained
during the year ... and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise."-
21
Since the Finance Committee published no reports,29 the reason for the change
is a matter of speculation.
In Hills the Tax Court reasonably inferred that the revision was intended
to eliminate a redundancy.30 The court then said: -[A]ll losses compensated
by insurance are also [necessarily] covered by insurance, ' 31 but "the con-
verse, i.e., that all losses covered by insurance are also compensated for, is
not necessarily true." 3 2 The court reasoned that since "compensated" en-
compasses "covered," the Finance Committee deleted "covered" and al-
lowed "compensated" to stand for both coverage and payment.
However, the court ignored an alternative argument, also based on a
redundancy theory, that would produce a different result. It might be that the
Committee decided that "compensated" and "covered" were identical in
meaning-that both denoted the concept of the availability of reimbursement.
The Committee therefore chose just one word, "compensated," to stand for
that concept in the final version, since the use of both words would be re-
dundant in the tautological sense.
Another possible explanation for the change from "covered" to "com-
pensated" avoids the problem with the redundancy theory. Instead of viewing
the State Finance Committee's version as a mere substitution of the word
"compensated" for "covered," one might view it as a rejection of the
House's attempt to set up a two-step test. Under the original House version,
to qualify for the loss deduction the casualty had to be "not covered by
insurance.., and compensated for.", 33 If the taxpayer failed either prong of
the test, that is, if he had insurance coverage or received compensation, then
24. J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS (1938-1861),
at 1018 (1938).
25. Pub. L. No. 227, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 509 (1894) (current version at I.R.C. § 165(a) (1978)).
26. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
27. J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS (1938--1861),
at 1018 (1938).
28. Id.
29. Hills v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 484, 487 n.5 (1981).
30. Id. at 487.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS (1938-1861),
at 1018 (1938) (emphasis added).
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the taxpayer could not take a deduction.3 4 Since all losses "compensated" by
insurance are "covered" by insurance, "covered" added nothing to the con-
struction; therefore, the Senate simply dropped the first prong of the test,
resulting in the existing "compensated for" language.1
5
A second weakness in the Tax Court's construction, as the four-judge
dissenting opinion pointed out,36 is the majority's statement that it is "ob-
vious" that a "covered" loss is not necessarily a "compensated" loss. This
begs the question because the "covered" loss will be "compensated" unless
the taxpayer chooses not to accept reimbursement. 37 The majority's reason-
ing is correct given the assumption that "compensated" means "paid."
However, this reasoning begs the question in another sense because the very
issue the court attempted to settle through an analysis of legislative history is
whether "compensated" means "paid."
A third problem with the majority's analysis is its use of the Treasury
regulations to support the view that "compensated" means "paid." 38 One
regulation states that "any loss actually sustained during the taxable year and
not made good by insurance or some other form of compensation shall be
allowed as a deduction subject to any provision of the internal revenue laws
which prohibits or limits the amount of the deduction." 3 9 In Hills the Tax
Court focused on the words "not made good by" and concluded that this
phrase implied actual receipt of compensation. 40 Whether or not this is so, the
loss must be "actually sustained during the taxable year." The question that
must be answered is whether a loss is sustained when insurance coverage
exists and the insurer has not denied liability during the taxable year.4' In
addition, the loss deduction is "subject to" the limitations of other provi-
sions,42 which prohibit the deduction in Hills. 43
The regulation states that "[i]n determining the amount of loss actually
34. But see Tripp & Vogel, Unreimbursed Insured Casualty Losses After Hills, 60 TAXES 154 (1982). The
authors maintain that under the original House version a loss covered by insurance would still be deductible
"Iunless [the] taxpayer was directly compensated or reimbursed." Id. at 155. Apparently, the authors are
interpreting the "and" that connects the "covered" clause and the "compensated" clause as a disjunctive
"or." No reason is given for this departure from the usual statutory construction. For example, see United
States v. Fisk, 70 U.S. 445 (1866); Schafer v. Helvering, 83 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir.), affd, 299 U.S. 171 (1936);
Seeley v. Helvering, 77 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1935); and R. DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL
DRAFTING 76-85 (1965).
35. J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS (1938--1861),
at 1018 (1938). Alternatively, the Senate Finance Committee could have dropped "compensated for" and kept
the "covered by" language. Probably, the Committee never envisioned that an individual would not claim his
insurance proceeds. The early courts apparently never did either, for they talked about losses being "covered"
by insurance. See infra text accompanying notes 126-46.
36. 76 T.C. 484, 493 (1981) (Sterrett, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 487-88.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(a) (1960).
40. 76 T.C. 484, 487-88 (1981).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 126-46.
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(a) (1960).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 152-84.
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sustained for purposes of section 165(a), proper adjustment shall be made for
any salvage value and for insurance or other compensation received." 44 The
word "received," which the Tax Court stressed, 45 can be read as modifying
only "other compensation," and not "insurance." More important, this
regulation is only concerned with the amount of the loss to be deducted. The
allowance of the loss is determined by the regulations quoted in the preceding
paragraph.
Finally, the court resorted to Wester's Dictionary to support its inter-
pretation that "compensated" means "paid." '  There is support for this
approach. 47 For example, the Supreme Court has said that "the words of
statutes-including revenue acts-should be interpreted where possible in
their ordinary, everyday senses." 48 But other meanings of "to compensate"
are "to weigh one thing against another" or "to counterbalance.", 49 In this
case the very thing to be weighed against the taxpayers' casualty loss is their
insurance coverage. This weighing or balancing occurs at two levels. First,
the insurance policy can be balanced against the loss to see if the type of loss
in question is covered by the policy. Second, the amount of the loss can be
balanced against the specific provisions of the insurance policy to see how
much of the loss will be paid. The result of the balancing process is the
compensation. Since the coverage balanced or equaled the loss in Hills, the
taxpayers can be regarded as compensated.
This analysis illustrates that there are other meanings of the word "com-
pensate" besides "pay" and that a different meaning produces a different
result when applied to the issue in Hills. Reliance on Webster's Dictionary,
though having some persuasive appeal, cannot be substituted for judicial
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(c)(4) (1960).
45. 76 T.C. 484, 488 (1981).
46. Id. at 487 & n.3.
47. In South Jersey Sand Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 360 (1958), the Tax Court referred to Webster's
New International Dictionary and the Encyclopedia Britannica in distinguishing between "sand" and "quartz-
ite" for purposes of applying the proper depletion rates. But see Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1945).
Judge Learned Hand warned:
[T]he decisions are legion in which (the courts] have refused to be bound by the letter, when it
frustrates the patent purpose of the whole statute .... [I]t is one of the surest indexes of a mature and
developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes
always have some purpose or object to accomplish.
Id. at 739.
48. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947). See also Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552
(1932):
The rule which should be applied is established by many decisions. "The legislature must be presumed
to use words in their known and ordinary signification."... "The popular or received import of
words furnishes the general rule for the interpretation of public laws .... "[T]he plain, obvious and
rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that
nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect
would discover." This rule is applied to taxing acts.
Id. at 560 (citations omitted). But see Malat v. Ruddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966) (per curiam). "Departure from a
literal reading of statutory language may, on occasion, be indicated by relevant internal evidence of the statute
itself and necessary in order to effect the legislative purpose." Id. at 571-72.
49. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 289 (2d college ed. 1980).
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precedents and principles of law when determining legal constructions of
words and phrases in the Internal Revenue Code.5
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A. Cases Considered by the Majority in Hills
The court in Hills considered several cases, but rejected them for various
reasons. Even though these cases technically are not binding precedents
upon the Tax Court (because they represent authority in circuits other than
the Fifth Circuit), they dealt with the issue in controversy, and the reasons for
their rejection by the Hills court seem weak.
In Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Glenn 5' the taxpayer did not file an insurance
claim for accidental damage to a steam generator because it feared losing its
insurance coverage and wanted to maintain good business relations with its
supplier, Westinghouse, against which the insurer had a right to sub-
rogation. 52 The district court disallowed the deduction because the accident
was covered by the insurance policy, 53 and the insurer had neither denied 54
nor disputed 55 its liability. Hence, the court concluded, the loss failed to
qualify as "not compensated for by insurance or otherwise."-56 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 57 affirmed because the loss "was not an 'unin-
sured loss.',,5
In Bartlett v. United States59 the district court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that "compensated" means "paid." ' 60 Moreover, the court accept-
ed the Government's position that since the casualty loss was "covered" by
insurance, the taxpayer's economic hardship was due to his voluntary choice
not to seek reimbursement, 61 and not to any "sudden .... physical forces
outside of the taxpayer's control," as required by section 165(c). 62
On facts similar to those in Hills, the Tax Court in Miller v. Commis-
sioner63 denied the taxpayer a casualty deduction for a loss "covered" by
50. See, e.g., United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 304 n.16 (1967), which states in reference to the
meaning of "away from home" in I.R.C. § 162(a)(2): "More than a dictionary is thus required to understand the
provision here involved, and no appeal to the 'plain language' of the section can obviate the need for further
statutory construction."
51. 250 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
52. Id. at 269-71.
53. Id. at 270.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 271.
56. Id. The language of I.R.C. § 23(f) (1940), applied in Kentucky Utilities, is identical to the language in
I.R.C. § 165(a) (1978).
57. Kentucky Utils. Co. v. Glenn, 394 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1968).
58. Id. at 633.
59. 397 F. Supp. 216 (D. Md. 1975).
60. Id. at 218.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 528 (1980), vacated, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 665 (1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1717 (6th
Cir. Nov. 10, 1981).
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insurance, since the court was bound by Kentucky Utilities pursuant to the
rule established in Golsen v. Commissioner64 (both Miller and Kentucky Util-
ities were brought in the Sixth Circuit). 65 After Hills was decided, Miler filed a
motion to revise, and the Tax Court vacated its earlier decision. The court
allowed Miller the deduction, citing Hills as authority, since Miller was then
deemed distinguishable from Kentucky Utilities.
66
Finally, although Morgan v. Commissioner67 was also appealable to the
Sixth Circuit, the court did not rely on Kentucky Utilities alone nor state that
it was following the Golsen rule. Rather, the Tax Court held that "com-
pensated" means "covered" and cited Axelrod v. Commissioner68 as author-
ity.
69
With respect to Kentucky Utilities, the Hills court admitted that an in-
sured loss is equivalent to one "covered" by insurance, 70 but added that this
"is not the statutory language before us." 7' The implication of the Kentucky
Utilities holding is quite clear, however. Because the loss was not an "unin-
sured loss," 72 by affirming the district court's view that it was not a loss "not
compensated for by insurance or otherwise" 73 the Sixth Circuit equated "in-
sured" with "compensated." Therefore, if "insured" is equivalent to
"covered," then Kentucky Utilities stands for the proposition that "covered"
is equivalent to "compensated."
In Hills the Tax Court simply concluded that Kentucky Utilities was
distinguishable, without revealing the process through which it reached its
conclusion.74 Some potential distinguishing factors follow. First, the loss in
Kentucky Utilities was a business loss that the taxpayer attempted to deduct
under section 165(c)(1), whereas in Hills the taxpayers suffered a theft loss
and sought to come under section 165(c)(3). Congress could allow more
favorable tax treatment for personal losses than for business losses, yet under
the I.R.C. both subsections 165(c)(1) and 165(c)(3) are subject to the general
requirement that for the loss to be deductible it must not be "compensated for
by insurance or otherwise."-
75
Second, the taxpayer in Kentucky Utilities had two sources of reim-
bursement: the insurance company under the policy and Westinghouse under
64. 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). The court stated:
"[I]t is our best judgment that better judicial administration requires us to follow a Court of Appeals decision
which is squarely in point where appeal from our decision lies to that Court of Appeals." Id. at 757.
65. Miller v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 528, 530 (1980).
66. Miller v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 665 (1981).
67. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 524 (1978).
68. 56 T.C. 248 (1971).
69. Morgan v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 524, 529 (1978).
70. Hills v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 484, 490 n.7 (1981).
71. Id.
72. Kentucky Utils. Co. v. Glenn, 394 F.2d 631, 633 (6th Cir. 1968).
73. Kentucky Utils. Co. v. Glenn, 250 F. Supp. 265, 271 (W.D. Ky. 1965), aff d, 394 F.2d 631 (6th Cir.
1968).
74. 76 T.C. 484, 490 (1981).
75. I.R.C. § 165(a) (1978).
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its warranty. The Hillses also had two sources of recoupment: the insurance
company and the thief. The difference between the two situations is that
Westinghouse was a responsible concern with sufficient funds to pay for the
loss, whereas the identity of the thief was unknown. The difference may make
the taxpayer in Kentucky Utilities more blameworthy for not seeking reim-
bursement, or may give Congress a basis upon which it can create a policy to
be more lenient with taxpayers like the Hillses. As stated above, however,
this is not the law. The taxpayer in Kentucky Utilities suffered a loss that was
covered by insurance and failed for personal reasons 76 to file a claim. This is
exactly the situation in Hills.
In Bartlett the court raised another issue. The loss was due to the tax-
payer's voluntary choice not to seek reimbursement. 77 Under this view there
never was a casualty under section 165(c). Hence, there is no need to decide
whether "compensated" means "covered" for purposes of section 165(a). 78
In Hills the court simply stated that it disagreed with this position.79
At the time Hills was decided the first opinion in Miller was not binding
on the Hills court by virtue of the Golsen rule since Georgia is not in the Sixth
Circuit. However, the first Miller opinion supports the argument that
Kentucky Utilities is not distinguishable from Hills, since in the first Miller
opinion, on facts similar to those in Hills, the court felt bound by Kentucky
Utilities. Furthermore, the Hills court itself would seem to have said as much
when it characterized the first Miller opinion as "abid[ing] by the rule an-
nounced in Kentucky Utilities.'80 Consequently, it appears that the Tax Court
in Hills said that Miller was not distinguishable from Kentucky Utilities. The
same court, after Hills, said in the second Miller opinion that Miller is virtually
identical to Hills."' Therefore, Hills must also be indistinguishable from
Kentucky Utilities. Apparently, the Tax Court changed its mind, because in
the second Miller opinion it held that Kentucky Utilities was distinguishable
from Miller for the same reasons it was distinguishable from Hills. , How-
ever, these reasons were never disclosed in Hills.
With respect to Morgan, the Hills court reasoned that since Morgan
relied on a view contained only in the concurring opinion of Judge Quealy in
76. Kentucky Utils. Co. v. Glenn, 250 F. Supp. 265, 270 (W.D. Ky. 1965), aff'd 394 F.2d 631 (6th Cir.
1968). Accord Messenger Corp. v. Smith, 136 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1943). The debtor went bankrupt and the
bankrupt estate paid five cents on the dollar. The taxpayer-creditor did not file a claim. The Seventh Circuit held
that the taxpayer had a "duty to reduce its loss." Accordingly, the taxpayer's deductible loss was reduced by
the amount that it could have received from the debtor, if it had filed a claim. Id. at 174.
77. Bartlett v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 216, 218 (D. Md. 1975).
78. Another way of looking at the Hills situation is the following. When a taxpayer elects not to file a claim
and demand the insurance proceeds to which he is entitled because he fears his policy will be cancelled, he in
essence elects to pay more for insurance coverage in the future. This windfall to the insurer in substance
represents additional premiums. Insurance premiums are not deductible for an individual taxpayer as a personal,
living, or family expense under § 262. Brief for Appellant at 15, Miller v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 665
(1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1717 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 1981).
79. 76 T.C. 484, 491 (1981).
80. Id. at 490 n.7.
81. Miller v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 665, 667 (1981).
82. Id.
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Axelrod, the Hills court was not bound by Morgan, and the statements in
Morgan offered only "limited guidance toward the resolution of the instant
dispute." 83 The Hills court ignored Morgan's holding that "compensated"
means "covered." m This is so whether Axelrod ever existed. Morgan was
the Tax Court precedent to be applied, not Axelrod.
The majority in Axelrod never reached the issue of the proper meaning of
"not compensated for by insurance or otherwise" in section 165(a). 85 Since
there was no evidence establishing the amount of the loss, 86 the deduction
was disallowed on that ground. s7
Judges Quealy and Fay discussed the more interesting issues in their
concurrences. In Hills the Commissioner took the position of Judge Quealy,s
and the taxpayers that of Judge Fay.8 9
Judge Quealy's view, and that of the Commissioner in Hills,90 was as
follows: "Any economic disadvantage which [the taxpayer] may have sus-
tained was not as a result of any casualty loss not being compensated for by
insurance but rather was as a result of his choosing not to accept the funds
available in compensation for any casualty loss." 9'
On the other hand, Judge Fay reasoned:
The insured individual is frequently compelled to forego the desirable benefits of
his insurance coverage in order to avert the otherwise inevitable cancellation of his
policy or prohibitive increase of his insurance rates. Under these circumstances,
such an individual is for all practical purposes without insurance, having been
forced to assume the risk of loss in order to assure his continued coverage, and
should be so treated. 92
Even if Judge Fay's reasoning is the preferred view, the taxpayers in
Hills failed to demonstrate that their situation fell within that rationale. 9 They
did not show that they were "compelled to forego" insurance reimbursement
to avoid "inevitable cancellation" of their policy or a "prohibitive increase"
in their premium rate.94 The taxpayers argued that "frequency of claims is a
prime reason for cancellation of policies by insurance companies. '
However, the findings of fact indicated that the three previous claims were
83. Hills v. Commissioner. 76 T.C. 484, 491 n.8 (1981).
84. Morgan v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 524, 529 (1978). See also Waxier Towing Co. v. United
States, 510 F. Supp. 297, 299-300 (W.D. Tenn. 1980), which characterized Bartlett, Kentucky Utilities, and
Morgan as standing for the proposition that "'compensated" means "covered."
85. Axelrod v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 248, 256 (1971).
86. Id. at 257.
87. Id. at 258.
88. Id. at 260-63 (Quealy, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 259-60 (Fay, J., concurring).
90. Hills v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 484, 486 (1981).
91. Axelrod v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 248, 261 (1971) (Quealy, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 260 (Fay, J., concurring). Furthermore, he adds that to hold the "contrary view is to discriminatm
against persons carrying insurance." Id. at 259. The fairness argument is discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 185-205.
93. Reply Brief for Respondent at 3.
94. Id.
95. Brief for Petitioners at 2.
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spaced over a six-year period at two- and four-year intervals, which the
Government contended were not frequent. 96 The fourth theft occurred two
years after the last claim. 97 The taxpayers "were reluctant to file a small theft
claim and jeopardize the fire insurance coverage on the house." 98 Their fear
was based on a general familiarity with the insurance industry rather than on
specific warnings or other information that their policy would be cancelled if
they made that fourth claim. 99 Furthermore, "They have not shown they
sought, and were denied, alternatives to their homeowners coverage such as an
increased deductible amount for theft loss or separate fire coverage."z'm The
facts therefore seem to indicate that the taxpayers in Hills were not "com-
pelled" to act as they did,"0' nor was cancellation of their policy "inevit-
able." 1I
Although none of the cases cited thus far was binding precedent upon
the court in Hills and, therefore, "should not preclude a fresh consideration of
this issue,"'0 3 three troublesome Tax Court opinions are directly on
point and indicate that the issue is far from "fresh." 104
B. Three Tax Court Precedents Overlooked by the Hills Court
The court in Hills apparently overlooked three important Tax Court
cases. In Whitney v. Commissioner'05 the taxpayer-trustee made a payment in
settlement of a suit against an employee, a truck driver, who struck and fatally
injured a third party. 106 As a result, the taxpayer-trustee claimed a casualty
96. Brief for Respondent at 3.
97. Id. at 4.
98. Brief for Petitioners at 2.
99. Reply Brief for Respondent at 4.
100. Id.
101. If the taxpayers really thought that a fourth theft claim would jeopardize their fire insurance, they
should have cancelled their theft coverage after the third claim in 1974 (or at least raised the deductible) instead
of continuing to pay premiums for theft coverage if they never intended to make another theft claim.
102. In the second Miller opinion the Tax Court vacated its earlier decision and allowed the deduction
pursuant to Hills, noting that Miller had a stronger basis for his fear of cancellation than did the Hillses because
the insurance company actually gave notice that it would terminate all of Miller's insurance policies on their next
renewal dates. Miller's broker persuaded the insurer to retain the existing policies in exchange for a higher
deductible provision. The broker then advised Miller not to make any more claims, other than for catastrophic
loss, or else the policies would be cancelled. 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 665, 666-67 (1981).
Several facts are worth stressing. First, it was the broker, not the insurance company, who warned Miller
not to make any more claims. Second, even when the insurance company had previously threatened to cancel
Miller's policies, the broker intervened and the policies were renewed with a higher deductible. These facts
indicate that Miller actually had a weaker basis for his fear of cancellation than did the Hillses. Miller had
already faced the threat of cancellation and had overcome it. The Hillses had never had that experience. As a
result, it cannot be maintained that the cancellation of Miller's policies was inevitable.
103. Hills v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 484, 490 (1981); see also Axelrod v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 248, 259
(1971) (Fay, J., concurring).
104. The Internal Revenue Service in Rev. Rul. 141, 1978-1 C.B. 58, stated that it will follow Bartlett,
Kentucky Utilities, and Judge Quealy's concurring opinion in Axelrod. Although this public statement did not
appear until 1978, the Service had taken this position earlier by its actions in two very old cases, which are
discussed later in this Case Comment: H.D. Lee Mercantile Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1935),
and Kurtz v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 679 (1927).
105. 13 T.C. 897 (1949).
106. Id. at 898-99.
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loss deduction pursuant to the predecessor of section 165(c)(3).' 07 In his brief
the taxpayer argued' 0 that the loss should be allowed either as a trade or
business loss '09 or as a loss in a transaction entered into for profit. 0 The Tax
Court held that it did not need to decide " which type of loss it was because,
in either event, to be deductible the loss had to "be one that is 'not compen-
sated for by insurance or otherwise.' "12 Under the law of Massachusetts a
trustee required to answer in damages for the negligence of an employee has a
right to indemnify himself from trust assets for any payments so made. 113 The
taxpayer-trustee was not at fault in Whitney, and the trust contained sufficient
assets to reimburse him. 4 The burden of proof was on the taxpayer to show
that he was unable to recoup his loss.' 5 As the Tax Court stressed:
Losses to be deductible under the revenue laws, must be actual, realized losses,
and in any case where there is a reasonable ground for reimbursement the taxpayer
must seek redress and may not secure a loss deduction until he establishes that no
recovery may be had. "It is a startling proposition that a taxpayer may, for
reasons of his own, decline to enforce a valid claim against a responsible concern
and then assert that he has sustained a business loss which the Government should
share." "16
In Hills the taxpayers did not suggest that their insurer was not a
"responsible concern." The taxpayers themselves conceded that "reim-
bursement for their loss could probably have been received from the insur-
ance company had a claim been filed." "7 Thus the Hillses had a "reasonable
ground for reimbursement." They did not prove an inability to recoup their
loss. Consequently, since the Hillses did not claim reimbursement from their
107. I.R.C. § 23(e)(3) (1940) (current version at I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (1978)). The pertinent parts of§ 23 are the
following:
§ 23 DEDUCTION FROM GROSS INCOME.
In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(e) LOSSES BY INDIVIDUALS.
In the case of an individual, losses sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by
insurance or otherwise-
(1) if incurred in trade or business; or
(2) if incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with the trade or
business; or
(3) of property not connected with the trade or business, if the loss arises from fires, storms,
shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.
108. 13 T.C. 897, 899 (1949).
109. I.R.C. § 23(e)(1) (1940) (current version at I.R.C. § 165(c)(1) (1978)).
110. Id. at (e)(2) (current version at § 165(c)(2)).
111. 13 T.C. 897, 899 (1949).
112. Id. at 900.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 901.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting M.D. Lee Mercantile Co. v. Commissioner 79 F.2d 391, 393 (10th Cir. 1935)).
117. Brief for Petitioners at 2.
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insurer, under Whitney they would not be deemed to have sustained a loss
that was "not compensated for by insurance or otherwise."" 8
In Henry Kraft Mercantile Co. v. Commissioner 9 the taxpayer's em-
ployee embezzled approximately $13,000. The taxpayer first discovered the
embezzlement in 1950. At that time the taxpayer had an indemnity bond of
$10,000. In addition, the employee delivered to the taxpayer in 1950 a $4,000
second mortgage on his home as security for the amount embezzled. The
taxpayer took a $13,000 loss deduction on its 1950 income tax return and
finally settled with its insurer in 1954 for $5,800. 120 The Tax Court specifically
rejected the taxpayer's plea that the court "interpret the word 'compen-
sated' . . . to mean 'recouped by the corpor4tion or paid to it by way of
restitution or indemnification.' 12' The court added: "We have been cited to
no cases where the word has been so construed, nor have we found any." 122
The Kraft Mercantile court concluded that since the loss was "covered" by
the second mortgage and an indemnity bond and the insurer had not denied
liability in the year the loss was discovered, the taxpayer did not sustain a loss
in 1950 that was "not compensated for by insurance or otherwise." 2
In Jewell v. Commissioner,'24 when discounting the applicability of
Kentucky Utilities and Bartlett to the facts before it, the Tax Court said:
These cases hold that a taxpayer is not entitled to a deduction for a casualty loss
when the casualty was covered by insurance even though he chose not to make a
claim for reimbursement under his insurance policy. The philosophy of these cases
is that the taxpayer's loss was not from the casualty but from his deliberate action
in not seeking to recover from the insurance company when in fact the loss was
"compensated" for by insurance. 125
Given this characterization and the facts of Hills, it is fair to say that the
Jewell court would not deem Kentucky Utilities distinguishable from Hills.
C. The Reasonable Prospect of Recovery Cases
A line of cases dealing with "the very troublesome question as to the year
in which the taxpayer should be allowed to take a deduction'" 26 supports the
principle stated in the regulations that when a reasonable prospect of recovery
exists, no casualty loss deduction is allowed "until it can be ascertained with
118. I.R.C. § 165(a) (1978). In Stephenson v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 311 (1928), the Board of Tax
Appeals interpreted the identical language in the predecessor to § 165. The court held that no loss deduction was
allowed because the taxpayers had not availed themselves of any remedy against the bank that sold them certain
securities. Since the taxpayers had recourse against the bank and the bank was not insolvent, no loss was
sustained. Id. at 320-21.
119. 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 833 (1955).
120. Id. at 833-34.
121. Id. at 835.
122. Id.
123. Id. On these facts the taxpayer should have received a $3200 deduction in 1954. See infra text
accompanying notes 126-39.
124. 69 T.C. 791 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 159-67.
125. 69 T.C. 791, 800-01 (1978).
126. Commissioner v. Highway Trailer Co., 72 F.2d 913, 913 (7th Cir. 1934).
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reasonable certainty whether or not such reimbursement will be received."' 2 7
Although the proper year of deduction was not the issue in Hills, these cases
are helpful in resolving the issue by showing that "compensated" means
"covered." In Gale v. Commissioner2 8 the Tax Court said:
[I]n determining whether the loss was "compensated for by insurance" [these
cases] have applied a test of the reasonableness of a taxpayer's prospects of
recovery of insurance proceeds, to determine in some cases that the loss was
deductible in the year the claim for compensation was settled.... and in other
cases that the loss was deductible in the year the casualty occurred. 
29
A reasonable prospect of recovery exists when a taxpayer has a bona fide
claim for recoupment with a substantial possibility of success. The court
applies this objective standard to determine the reasonable expectation as of
the close of the taxable year for which the deduction is claimed. Consequent-
ly, the standard is applied by foresight using only the facts that are reasonably
foreseeable as of the close of the particular year. Hence, future settlements
and judicial actions will not be controlling if there is no reasonable prospect of
recovery in the year the deduction is claimed. 30
In Allied Furriers Corp. v. Commissioner'31 the Board of Tax Appeals
held that if a casualty is covered by insurance or otherwise, no loss deduction
is allowed in the year of casualty; rather, the deduction, if any, is allowed in
the year of settlement.
32
In Licht v. Commissioner 33 the taxpayer suffered a fire in 1931 that was
"covered" by insurance. The New York Board of Fire Underwriters held
hearings extending through 1931. The taxpayer sued the insurer in 1932 and a
settlement was reached in 1933. '14 The court held that, given no evidence that
the insurer denied liability in 1931, '3 the casualty was "compensated for by
insurance" in 1931, and the loss was not sustained until 1933 upon termination
of recovery proceedings when the loss deduction was allowed.
36
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i) (1960); Commissioner v. Harwick, 184 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1950); Cahn v.
Commissioner, 92 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1937); Commissioner v. Highway Trailer Co., 72 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1934);
Gale v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 269 (1963); Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1053 (1956);
Brown v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 156 (1954); Licht v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 1096 (1938); Allied Furriers
Corp. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 457 (1931); Kurtz v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 679 (1927).
128. 41 T.C. 269 (1963).
129. Id. at 275 (citations omitted).
130. Ramsay Scarlett & Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 795, 811 (1974).
131. 24 B.T.A. 457 (1931).
132. Id. at 459. See also Commissioner v. Harwick, 184 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1950).
133. 37 B.T.A. 1096 (1938).
134. Id. at 1099.
135. Although denial of liability by the insurer is itself not conclusive in determining the reasonableness of
the prospects of recovery, it is a factorto be considered. Gale v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 269,276(1963). When the
insurer denies liability on the ground that the loss was not even covered by the policy, the courts have concluded
that there was no reasonable prospect of recovery and have held the loss deductible in the year of casualty.
Cahn v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1937); Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1053
(1956). Similar results have been reached when the amount of damage was in excess of insurance coverage.
Commissionerv. Highway TrailerCo., 72 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1934); Brown v. Commissioner, 23T.C. 156 (1954).
136. 37 B.T.A. 1096, 1101 (1938).
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These cases allowed the deduction in the year of settlement because the
taxpayer had previously had a "tenable claim against his insurer," '37 that is, a
reasonable prospect of recovery. 138 They support the position that the insured
taxpayer's loss was "compensated for" at the time of the casualty.t39
Taken together, Allied Furriers and Licht stand for the proposition that if
a casualty is covered by insurance, there is a reasonable prospect of re-
covery. 140 In addition, if there is a reasonable prospect of recovery, the loss is
"compensated" for by insurance. 14' Therefore, if a casualty is "covered" by
insurance, it is "compensated" for by insurance.
Kurtz v. Commissioner142 supports this conclusion. There the taxpayer
suffered a fire in 1921 that was "covered" by insurance, and he received
partial reimbursement in 1922 and the remainder in 1923.143 The taxpayer
wanted to deduct the full amount of the loss in 1921 and report the insurance
reimbursement as income in the years 1922 and 1923 when actually receiv-
ed.'44 The Commissioner applied the total amount of the insurance coverage
against the fire loss in 1921 and disallowed the deduction.'45 The Board of Tax
Appeals agreed with the Commissioner and held that "[t]he [taxpayer] was
compensated by insurance for the total loss sustained in the year 1921. The
insurance due [the taxpayer] for the loss sustained, accrued in the year 1921
and was properly applied in that year against the amount of the loss by
fire." 146 By holding that the taxpayer was "compensated" in 1921, the Board
of Tax Appeals essentially equated "compensated" with "covered" because
in 1921 the taxpaper had received no money by way of reimbursement for the
loss. All the taxpayer possessed in 1921 was the insurance coverage.
Finally, the Tax Court in Hills argued that if, in the litigation context, the
Treasury regulations consider "settlement," "adjudication," and "aban-
donment" as proper determinants of the reasonable prospect of recovery, 47
then practical considerations also should be relevant in the insurance context
to determine whether the taxpayer's "interests would be better served by
never asserting his recovery rights." "8 However, these same regulations also
state: "When a taxpayer claims that the taxable year in which a loss is sus-
tained is fixed by his abandonment of the claim for reimbursement, he must be
able to produce objective evidence of his having abandoned the claim, such as
137. Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1053, 1056 (1956).
138. Licht v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 1096, 1100 (1938).
139. Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1053, 1056 (1956).
140. See also Gleason. Tax Aspects of hIsurance Recoveries for Casualty Losses. 24 INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 489, 506 n.75 (1966).
141. Licht v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 1096, 1100 (1938).
142. 8 B.T.A. 679 (1927).
143. Id. at 684.
144. Id. at 682.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 684.
147. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i)(1960).
148. 76 T.C. 484, 489 (1981).
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the execution of a release." 149 In Hills there was no signed release, no accord
and satisfaction, and presumably, the time for making the claim under the
insurance policy had not expired before the taxable year in question ended.
Therefore, the Hillses had not legally abandoned anything.
The Tax Court's view of abandonment in Hills, moreover, may miss the
point of the regulations. The litigation context presumes the prior existence of
a claim. The opposing party's denial of liability is the reason for the suit to
enforce that claim. In Hills no claim was filed by the taxpayers,' 50 and the
insurer did not deny liability. '5' There was nothing under the regulations for
the taxpayers to abandon. Thus, these regulations do not apply to a situation
similar to that in Hills.
IV. ANALOGIES TO OTHER CODE SECTIONS
The Supreme Court has stated that "[a]U acts of the legislature should be
so construed, if practicable, that one section will not defeat or destroy an-
other, but explain and support it,' ' 5 2 and the Board of Tax Appeals has said
that since taxation is such a practical matter, the revenue laws "must be
construed as a whole." '53 By reference to other sections of the I.R.C., it is
evident that internal consistency requires that "compensated" means
"covered" and that the taxpayer should not be permitted to forego claiming
his insurance reimbursement and take an income tax deduction instead.'s
In M.D. Lee Mercantile Co. v. Commissioner '5 the taxpayer ordered
and paid for 133,000 yards of cloth. The taxpayer, demanding credit, claimed
the cloth was not up to standard and returned it to the seller. Negotiations
failed. After seven years the taxpayer determined the account to be uncollect-
able and deducted the cost of the returned cloth on its income tax return.'
56
The taxpayer argued that it had a loss "not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise," or alternatively, that it had a worthless debt under section 166.
The court found neither a loss nor a bad debt because "the defaulter was a
large and responsible concern, amply able to respond for breaches of con-
tract." '57 The court added: "It is a startling proposition that a taxpayer may,
for reasons of his own, decline to enforce a valid claim against a responsible
149. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i) (1960).
150. 76 T.C. 484, 485 (1981).
151. Id. at 492 (Sterrett, J., dissenting).
152. Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U.S. 242, 246 (1893).
153. Brons Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 376, 381 (1936).
154. See United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, Inc., 349 U.S. 232 (1955). The Supreme Court
-onsidered the "'internal symmetry and consistency" of the I.R.C. and decided that to be "faithful to the
statutory scheme," the words "paid or accrued" should have the same meaning in different parts of the Code.
id. at 236. See also Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1938). The court held
that when a tax statute is "ambiguous or doubtful," other sections of the act that are "somewhat analogous in
principle" are "entitled to great weight" in interpreting the ambiguous statute. Id. at 719.
155. 79 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1935), affg 3 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 37 (1934).
156. Id. at 392.
157. Id.
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concern and then assert that he has sustained a business loss which the
government should share." 1
58
In Jewell v. Commissioner 59 one issue was whether certain medical
expenses were "compensated for by insurance or otherwise" under section
213(a).' 60 The taxpayer paid the medical expenses of his parents with checks
drawn on his personal account. 16' The Commissioner argued that since the
names of both the taxpayer and his parents were on a second, joint account, in
which his parents deposited their Social Security checks, pension checks, and
interest income, the taxpayer was reimbursed for his medical expense pay-
ments. 162 The Tax Court held that if the taxpayer had a right to the funds in the
joint account, he would have been reimbursed' 63 for the medical payments.64
The court also held that under Indiana property law the requisite donor intent
was lacking. Therefore, the taxpayer had no current ownership rights to the
funds in the joint account. 65 Hence, the taxpayer was not reimbursed and the
deduction was allowed. '66
When the Tax Court in Jewell equated "right to the funds" with reim-
bursement (that is, with compensation under section 213(a)), it consequently
was not referring to actual payment received by the taxpayer. All the tax-
payers had to do in Hills was assert their right against the insurer and receive
their money. No substantive difference exists between these two situations.
Thus there appears to be no reason to interpret the phrase "not compensated
for by insurance or otherwise" one way for a casualty loss deduction and a
different way for a medical expense deduction. 67 Under the Jewell rationale
the taxpayers in Hills were "compensated by insurance or otherwise" and no
deduction should be allowed to them.
158. Id. at 393. This is the court's position whether the taxpayer's reasons stem from business considerations
or from friendly motives. Id. Accord Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 1176. 1181 (6th Cir. 1980);
Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 560 F.2d 627, 644 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978);
Loewi v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 621,625 (7th Cir. 1956); Bratton v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 486,489 (6th Cir.
1954); Ligget's Estate v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 548,550 (10th Cir. 1954); O'Bryan Bros. v. Commissioner, 127
F.2d 645, 646 (6th Cir. 1942).
159. 69 T.C. 791 (1978).
160. Id. at 792.
161. Id. at 798.
162. Id. at 793, 798.
163. "Reimbursed'" meaning "compensated for," not by insurance, but "otherwise- as contained in the
clause in I.R.C. § 213(a) (1978).
164. 69 T.C. 791, 802 (1978).
165. Id. at 802--04.
166. Id. at 804.
167. There is a presumption that identical words used in different parts of the Code have the same meaning.
Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934). This presumption will yield to circumstances
that clearly show a contrary meaning, such as when the words were employed with different legislative intent in
different sections because the sections have different histories and purposes. Id. Accord Baker v. Commission-
er, 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953); Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1946); Estate of Cuddihy v.
Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1171, 1176 (1959). Both the casualty loss deduction under § 165 and the medical expense
deduction under § 213 are allowed because they are not normal costs of living; they are involuntary, and they
may reduce the taxpayer's ability to pay tax. B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 265 (5th
ed. 1980). Since both sections have similar purposes, the presumption stands. Accordingly, the identical words,
"not compensated for by insurance or otherwise," used in both sections should be given the same meaning.
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In Heidt v. Commissioner'68 the taxpayer-employee used his personal
automobile in connection with company business.' 69 The employer had a
general policy of reimbursement for such expenses,' 70 but the taxpayer volun-
tarily gave up the reimbursement 7' he would have received had he filed a
claim 72 because he wanted "to avoid possible criticism in dealing with his
subordinates." 73 The court concluded that the auto expenses were not ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses of the taxpayer under section 162(a)
because there was no evidence that if the taxpayer had claimed reimburse-
ment it would not have been granted.' 74
In Hills no evidence existed that the insurer would have denied re-
imbursement had the taxpayers filed a claim,' 7' and like Heidt, the Hillses
voluntarily gave up reimbursement for personal reasons.76 Thus, the casualty
loss deduction in Hills could be disallowed on the basis of the Heidt rationale
as well.
In the dissenting opinion in Hills Judge Sterrett argued that "[j]ust as a
taxpayer cannot avoid taxation by turning his back on income, a taxpayer
should not be allowed a deduction because he has refused to accept reim-
bursement." '77 The assignment of income cases also stand for the principle
that a taxpayer can have taxable income even though he actually receives no
cash or property. 7 8 These cases have held that a taxpayer cannot avoid
reporting gross income under section 61 simply by refusing to accept it, if the
168. 274 F.2d 25 (7th Cir.), affg 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 149 (1959).
169. Id. at 26.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 28.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 27.
174. Id. at 28. Accord Coplon v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1960); Neal v. Commissioner, 41
T.C.M. (CCH) 1247 (1981); Fountain v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 696 (1973); Phillips v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M.
(CCH) 255 (1973); Carter v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 932 (1%9); Stolk v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 345 (1%3);
Krych v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 44 (1961); Rogers v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 866 (1959);
Estate of McJunkin v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 16 (1955); Kimball v. Commissioner, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 1011
(1955); Podems v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 21 (1955); Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1310 (1946);
Glendinning, McLeish & Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 518 (1931).
175. Hills v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 484, 492 (1981) (Sterrett, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 485. But see Tripp & Vogel, Unreimbursed Insurance Casualty Losses After Hills, 60 TAXES
154 (1982). The authors argue that an involuntary election by an employee not to claim reimbursement from his
employer can result in a tax deduction. Id. at 159-60 n.34. They cite Phillips v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH)
225 (1973), as authority. In Phillips the taxpayer used his personal auto for company business, but did not claim
reimbursement from his employer. The Commissioner contended that since it was the company policy to
reimburse the taxpayer, no deduction was allowable because taxpayer had voluntarily given up his right to
reimbursement. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner's legal principle but not with its application to the
facts. It found that the company reimbursement policy was verbally countermanded by taxpayer's supervisor,
who limited the amount of reimbursement. The taxpayer claimed and received reimbursement for the amount
permitted. The Tax Court allowed the excess as a tax deduction, not because there was an involuntary relin-
quishment of a right to reimbursement, but because no such right existed. Id. at 258.
177. 76 T.C. 484, 492 (1981) (Sterrett, J., dissenting).
178. Taxable income is gross income reduced by certain allowable deductions. I.R.C. § 63 (1978). It can be
compared to a coin: the deduction of expenses and losses and the inclusion of income items are flip sides of the
same taxable income coin.
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taxpayer has the power,179 control,'80 right,"' or means's' to obtain that in-
come from its source. The taxpayers in Hills had the power, control, right,
and means to obtain reimbursement from their insurer. All they had to do was
ask for it. They even conceded "that reimbursement... could probably
have been received ... had a claim been filed." 83 If having the power, con-
trol, right, or means to acquire income is as good as having that income, then
having the power, control, right, or means to obtain reimbursement for a
casualty loss should be as good as having that reimbursement, when that
entitlement is subject only to the taxpayer's "unfettered command."84
V. FAIRNESS AND TAx POLICY
The Tax Court in Hills reasoned that "[w]hen a taxpayer fails to pursue a
right of insurance recovery, his economic loss is nonetheless sustained and a
deduction should be allowed. To hold otherwise would unjustifiably advan-
tage taxpayers who voluntarily decline insurance coverage." 185 In Axelrod
Judge Fay said that to disallow the deduction to a taxpayer in a situation
179. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). The taxpayer detached some interest coupons from his
negotiable bonds and delivered them to his son as a gift. The interest income was held taxable to the taxpayer-
donor since he had the power to dispose of that income. Id. at 118. See also Mitchel v. Bowers, 15 F.2d 287 (2d
Cir. 1926). The taxpayer entered into an agreement with his wife which provided that she would be entitled to
one half of the income that was distributed to the taxpayer from Power, Son & Co. Id. at 288. Assuming the
contract not to be a sham, the court held that since the taxpayer had the power to terminate the contract at will
and resume title to the company profits, the absolute disposition of the income was within the taxpayer's power
and all of the income should be taxed to him. Id. at 288-89.
180. Gait v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954). The taxpayer leased his racetrack to a trotting
association and subsequently assigned 20% of the rental income to each of three sons. Id. at 43. The taxpayer
could not escape taxation on that 60% of the income because he had retained title to the property. Id. at 46. The
income was taxed to the donor because he retained control of the source from which it flowed. Id. at 47. Accord
Lum v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1945); Midwood Assocs. v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 871 (2d Cir.
1940); Mitchel v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 101 (1932). In Henson v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 846 (5th Cir.
1949), the taxpayer made a bona fide gift of his business to his wife with no strings attached. She had the right to
control the income of the company and, therefore, the income was taxed to the wife and not to the taxpayer-
husband. Id. at 847. Accord Montgomery v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1956); Semmler v. Commis-
sioner, 173 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1949) (per curiam). See also Brown v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940).
The taxpayer assigned his right to receive compensation for his legal services to a corporation he wholly owned.
The compensation was held taxable to Brown because he did not part with control of the income. Id.
181. Duran v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1941). The taxpayer sold a high volume of life
insurance for the New York Life Insurance Co. each year for 20 years and became entitled to monthly payments
of approximately $480 for the rest of his life. The taxpayer assigned his future payments to his sister, but the
court still held that those payments were taxable to him because he created the right to receive that income. Id.
at 325-26. Accord Vance v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1168 (1950).
182. Commissioner v. O'Donnell, 90 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1937). The taxpayer sold stock in exchange for a
one-third interest in the net profits derived from the development and operation ofoil properties. Id. at 907. The
court noted that mere intention to make agift is not sufficient to create agift. When the taxpayer delivered to the
purchaser a letter directing it to make all future payments under the contract to his wife, however, he made a
completed gift because he gave his wife the means of obtaining possession and control of his gift, which was
tantamount to making a delivery of the corpus of the gift to his wife. Id. at 909.
183. Brief for Petitioners at 2.
184. McCauley v. Commissioner, 44 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1930).
185. 76 T.C. 484, 488 (1981).
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similar to that in Hills "is to discriminate against persons carrying insurance,
a result which I do not think was intended." 
86
Some commentators reason that the casualty deduction is allowed be-
cause the casualty loss is not a normal cost of living-it is involuntary and
may reduce the taxpayer's ability to pay tax. 187 The Senate Finance Commit-
tee, stating its reasons for section 165, said that "casualty and theft losses
will continue to be deductible ... in those cases where they are sufficient in
size to have a significant effect upon an individual's ability to pay Federal
income taxes." 88 When a taxpayer has insurance coverage, his ability to pay
taxes is not lessened. The insurance coverage supplies the necessary re-
sources. No economic hardship exists.
This view is supported by the Supreme Court:
[I]t is a general rule, without exception, in construing statutes, that effect must be
given to all their provisions if such a construction is consistent with the general
purposes of the act and the provisions are not necessarily conflicting. ... When a
provision admits of more than one construction, that one will be adopted which
best serves to carry out the purposes of the act. 189
Under the facts of Hills, if "compensated" means "paid" instead
of "covered," the taxpayers would be allowed the casualty loss deduc-
tion under section 165(a). This would be contrary to the purpose of the provi-
sion, which is to give some relief to those individuals whose ability to pay
income taxes is reduced. Since the insurance policy is an asset owned by the
taxpayers and included in their net worth, which balances and offsets the loss,
it prevents a reduction in their ability to pay income taxes. On the other hand,
if "compensated" means "covered," section 165(a) would recognize the in-
surance coverage as compensation and disallow the deduction. This is con-
sistent with the purpose of the provision since the ability to pay income taxes
is not reduced and no relief is needed by the taxpayer. Therefore, the better
construction of section 165(a) is to equate "compensated" with "covered."
This is especially so when the above analysis is coupled with the judicial
186. 56 T.C. 248. 259 (1971) (Fay, J., concurring). Judge Fay also stated, however, that "a taxpayer's
failure to collect payment under an insurance policy may sometimes justify disallowance of a loss deduction."
Id. at 260. Apparently he would prefer some sort of subjective test or case-by-case analysis. This approach
would put a tremedous strain on adminstrative efficiency and would hamstring an already overburdened judi-
ciary.
187. B. BITrKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 265 (5th ed. 1980). See generally 2 B.
BIT'KER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs " 34.1 (1981).
188. S. REP. NO. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1673,
1730.
189. Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U.S. 242, 246 (1893). See Malat v. Ruddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966) (per curiam).
"Departure from a literal reading of statutory language may, on occasion, be indicated by relevant internal
evidence of the statute itself and necessary in order to effect the legislative purpose." Id. at 571-72. See also
Brons Hotel. Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 376, 381 (1936) (a sensible construction of a statute is one that
effectuates legislative intent); I J. MERTENS, THE LAWv OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3.04 (rev. ed.
1981). "The courts will ... not hesitate to depart from a literal interpretation in order to reach the real consis-
tent legislative intent .... The literal meaning of words cannot be insisted upon in resisting a tax provision so as
to defeat its purpose." Id. (citations omitted).
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precedents discussed earlier.'90 That this compelling statutory construction
discriminates against taxpayers carrying insurance "may suggest that changes
in the law are desirable. But if they are to be made, Congress must make
them." ''
"[Tiaxability depends upon the actual circumstances existing at the time
of the [casualty]." '92 Congress did not intend to punish people who were inept
prophets, who did not expect a casualty, or who were too poor to afford
insurance.' 93 It does not matter whether the taxpayers in Hills are treated
differently from a taxpayer who does not have insurance. The I.R.C. does not
concern itself with hindsight analysis,' 94 that is, with what the taxpayers
should have done before the event in question. Accordingly, the court should
only look to see whether the taxpayer has insurance at the time of the casual-
ty.
The view that a taxpayer should not have the choice to refuse his insur-
ance proceeds and, instead, take a casualty loss deduction on his income tax
return is supported by another long-standing policy of taxation. In Burnet v.
Sanford & Brooks Co. 195 the Supreme Court stated:
All the revenue acts which have been enacted since the adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment have uniformly assessed the tax on the basis of annual
returns showing the net result of all the taxpayer's transactions during a fixed
accounting period, either the calendar year, or, at the option of the taxpayer, the
particular fiscal year which he may adopt.'
96
The taxpayers in Hills and Miller, in essence, were asking the court to
look beyond the taxable year in question to an event (cancellation of the
insurance policy) whose occurrence was speculative and to use that uncer-
190. See supra notes 51-184 and accompanying text.
191. United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, Inc., 349 U.S. 232, 236 (1955). "'[G]eneral equitable
considerations' do not control the question of what deductions are permissible." Id. See also supra note 154 and
accompanying text. In LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377 (1921), the Supreme Court stated:
The difficulty of adjusting any system of taxation so as to render it precisely equal in its bearing is
proverbial, and such nicety is not even required of the States under the equal protection clause, much
less of Congress under the more general requirement of due process of law in taxation. Of course it will
be understood that Congress has very ample authority to adjust its income taxes according to its
discretion.... Courts have no authority to pass upon the propriety of its measures.
Id. at 392-93. In Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), the Supreme Court indicated the extent to which the courts
must defer to Congress regarding economic legislation, especially tax legislation:
[F]or, as this court repeatedly has held, the power to tax carries with it "'the power to embarrass and
destroy"; may be applied to every object within its range "in such measure as Congress may deter-
mine"; enables that body "'to select one calling and omit another, to tax one class of property and to
forbear to tax another"; and may be applied in different ways to different objects so long as there is
"geographical uniformity" in the duties, imposts and excises imposed.
Id. at 256.
192. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 864, 872 (6th Cir. 1957).
193. "As for the casualty-loss deduction, its effect is not so much to compensate people whose well-being
has been impaired as to compensate people who have lacked the foresight to insure." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 378 (2d ed. 1977).
194. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Surasky v. United States, 325 F.2d 191, 194 (5th
Cir. 1963). See generally Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
195. 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
196. Id. at 363.
[Vol. 43:513
COMPENSATED FOR BY INSURANCE
tainty as a reason to allow a deduction in the current year. The Supreme Court
has rejected the notion that a taxpayer can postpone "the assessment of the
tax until the end of a lifetime, or for some other indefinite period, to ascertain
more precisely whether the final outcome of the period, or of a given transac-
tion, will be a gain or a loss." 97
Consider the consequences of the taxpayer's request. Even if a claim is
filed and payment received, the insurance policy may not be cancelled.' 98 It
appears that the taxpayer is proposing some sort of reasonable prospect of
cancellation test instead of using the reasonable prospect of recovery test as
required by the Treasury regulations'" and the courts. 20° Even if the taxpayer
could prove with reasonable certainty that the policy would be cancelled if a
claim were filed, no economic loss exists by virtue of the cancellation until
another casualty occurs. But another casualty may never occur. A second test
would be needed: a reasonable prospect of another casualty.
The taxpayers in Hills and Miller asked the Tax Court to grant them a
loss deduction for a casualty for which no insurance claim was filed, because
the insurance policy may have been cancelled and another casualty may have
occured to produce an economic detriment greater than their paying for the
current small loss themselves. The taxpayers' actions may have made good
business sense, but this double probability approach applied on a case-by-case
determination would place a great burden on administrative and judicial effi-
ciency. The reasonable prospect of recovery test by itself has produced many
cases.2"' To apply two more levels of scrutiny would be too much to ask of an
already overburdened judiciary. The court should only consider the facts and
circumstances in existence at the close of the taxable year. 21 If the taxpayer
does have insurance coverage, and a reasonable prospect of recovery does
exist, then the taxpayer is compensated, with no deduction allowed in the year
of the loss. 203 If the taxpayer has no insurance or other form of coverage, then
the deduction should be allowed in the year of loss,201 with reinstatement into
income in future years if recoupment from other sources is obtained. 205
VI. CONCLUSION
The original intent of Congress indicates that a casualty loss is not deduc-
tible under section 165(a) if it is covered by insurance. This intent is supported
by the precedents that consider covered losses to be nondeductible. This is so
197. Id. at 365.
198. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
199. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2) (1960).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 126-46.
201. See id.; 5 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 28.51 (rev. ed. 1980).
202. Ramsay Scarlett & Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 795, 811 (1974).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 126-41.
204. Commissioner v. Highway Trailer Co., 72 F.2d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 1934).
205. United States v. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398,403 (1927);Treas. Reg. §§ 1.11 m-(a) (1956),
i. 165-1(d)(2)(iii) (1960).
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even though the statute uses the word "compensated." Hence, the courts
implicitly equate "covered" with "compensated." Moreover, Tax Court pre-
cedent specifically rejects the interpretation that equates "compensated"
with "paid." A line of cases dealing with the reasonable prospect of recovery
issue looks to whether a loss is covered (by insurance or otherwise) to deter-
mine the proper year of deduction-denying the deduction in the year of
casualty when such coverage exists.
Furthermore, precedents of the Tax Court and other courts with respect
to not only section 165 but also other sections of the I.R.C. support the
proposition that a taxpayer is not permitted to forego claiming insurance
coverage or other reimbursement and as an alternative take an income tax
deduction. This judicial interpretation is supported by the fairness concept of
taxation, the purpose underlying the adoption of section 165, and long-stand-
ing income tax policy. As a result, the doctrine of stare decisis, applied to
statutory law, mandates that Hills and Miller not be followed.
Edward C. Samsel
